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Abstract. We study computational problems arising from the iterated removal of weakly
dominated actions in anonymous games. Our main result shows that it is NP-complete
to decide whether an anonymous game with three actions can be solved via iterated weak
dominance. The two-action case can be reformulated as a natural elimination problem on
a matrix, the complexity of which turns out to be surprisingly difficult to characterize and
ultimately remains open. We however establish connections to a matching problem along
paths in a directed graph, which is computationally hard in general but can also be used
to identify tractable cases of matrix elimination. We finally identify different classes of
anonymous games where iterated dominance is in P and NP-complete, respectively.
1. Introduction
An anonymous game is characterized by the fact that players do not distinguish between
other players in the game, i.e., their payoff only depends on the number of other players
playing the different actions, but not on their identities. Anonymous games constitute a
very natural class of multi-player games which is also highly relevant in practice (cf. [7]).
Symmetric games additionally have identical payoff functions for all players. A strategy of
a player is a probability distribution over his actions, and we say that an action is weakly
dominated if there exists a strategy of the same player guaranteeing him at least the same
payoff for any combination of strategies of the other players, and strictly more payoff for
some such combination.1 Dominated actions may be discarded for the simple reason that
the player will never face a situation where he would benefit from using these actions.
The solution concept of iterated dominance works by removing a dominated action and
applying the same reasoning to the reduced game (e.g., [15]). A game is then called solvable
by iterated dominance if there is a sequence of eliminations that leaves only one action for
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1Some authors (e.g., [10, 13]) use the terms weak dominance or dominance to refer to a weaker notion
that does not require the dominating strategy to sometimes yield a strictly higher payoff. This notion is
called very weak dominance by other authors (e.g., [2, 4]).
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each player. Interestingly, anonymous games often arise in the context of voting, where
dominance solvability was originally introduced [14].
Unlike iterated strict dominance, which requires the dominating action in each step to
be strictly better for every combination of strategies of the other players, proper epistemic
foundations for iterated weak dominance are fairly hard to come by (e.g., [3, 19]). Never-
theless, iterated weak dominance is an established and well-studied solution concept that
occurs in virtually every textbook on game theory. Its computational properties, however,
are not well understood, particularly in restricted classes like anonymous games. Potential
computational hardness of iterated weak dominance stems from the fact that the result of
the elimination process generally depends on the order in which actions are eliminated.
Related Work. Deciding whether a game in normal form can be solved by iterated weak
dominance is NP-complete already for games with two players and two different payoffs and
when restricted to dominance by pure strategies [10, 6]. In two-player constant-sum games,
both solvability and eliminability of a given action become tractable, while reachability of
a subgame remains NP-complete [4]. The corresponding problems for strict dominance can
generally be solved in polynomial time [6].
All of the above results concern games with few players and an unbounded number
of actions. Unlike general normal-form games, anonymous and symmetric games allow for
a succinct representation even when the number of players is unbounded. Computational
aspects of these games, particularly with respect to Nash equilibrium, have recently come
under increased scrutiny due to their importance in modeling large anonymous environments
like the Internet. A Nash equilibrium of a symmetric game can be found in polynomial time
if the number of actions is not too large compared to the number of players [16]. In the
larger class of anonymous games, Nash equilibria admit a polynomial-time approximation
scheme when there is only a constant number of actions [7]. The pure equilibrium problem
is tractable in anonymous games with a constant number of actions, and NP-complete if
the number of actions grows in the number of players [5].
Results and Paper Structure. We begin by introducing the relevant game-theoretic
concepts. In Section 3 we show that iterated dominance solvability is NP-hard for symmetric
games with an unbounded number of actions, and tractable for symmetric games with a
constant number of actions. The rest of the paper is then concerned with the only remaining
class, anonymous games with a constant number of actions. In Section 4, we show how
the two-action case can be reformulated as a natural elimination problem on a matrix.
The complexity of this problem remains open, but in Section 5 we draw connections to
a matching problem on paths of a directed graph. The latter problem, which may be of
independent interest, is intractable in general but allows us to obtain efficient algorithms
for restricted versions of matrix elimination. In Section 6 we finally use the matching
formulation to show NP-hardness of iterated dominance in anonymous games with three
actions. Proofs are omitted due to space constraints, and will be given in the full version
of the paper.
2. Preliminaries
An accepted way to model situations of strategic interaction is by means of a normal-
form game (e.g., [15]).
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Definition 2.1 (normal-form game). A game in normal-form is a tuple Γ =
(N, (Ai)i∈N , (pi)i∈N ), where N is a finite set of players and for each player i ∈ N , Ai
is a finite set of actions available to player i and pi : (
∏
i∈N Ai)→ R is a function mapping
each action profile, i.e., each combination of actions, to a real-valued payoff for player i.
We write Si = ∆(Ai) for the set of (mixed) strategies of player i ∈ N , i.e., the set of
probability distributions over his actions, and call a strategy pure if it selects some action
with probability one. A vector s ∈
∏
i∈N Si will be called a strategy profile. Payoff functions
naturally extend to strategy profiles, and we write pi(s) for the expected payoff of player i
in strategy profile s. We further write n = |N | for the number of players in a game, si for
the ith element of strategy profile s, and s−i for the vector of all elements of s but si.
We will henceforth concentrate on games where Ai = A for all i ∈ N and some set A.
Such a game is anonymous if the payoff of player i is invariant under any automorphism π′ :
AN → AN of the set of actions profiles induced by a permutation π : N → N of the set of
players that satisfies π(i) = i (e.g., [5]). An intuitive way to describe anonymous games is
in terms of equivalence classes of the automorphism group of π′, using a notion introduced
by Parikh [18] in the context of context-free languages. Given a set A of actions, the
commutative image of an action profile aN ∈ A
N is given by #(aN ) = (#(a, aN ))a∈A where
#(a, aN ) = |{ i ∈ N : ai = a }|. In other words, #(a, aN ) denotes the number of players
playing action a in action profile aN , and #(aN ) is the vector of these numbers for all
the different actions. This definition naturally extends to action profiles for subsets of the
players. We consider four types of anonymity (cf. [5]).
Definition 2.2 (anonymity). Let Γ = (N, (Ai)i∈N , (pi)i∈N ) be a normal-form game, A a
set of actions such that Ai = A for all i ∈ N . Γ is called
• anonymous if pi(aN ) = pi(a
′
N ) for all i ∈ N and all aN , a
′
N ∈ A
N with ai = a
′
i and
#(a−i) = #(a
′
−i),
• symmetric if pi(aN ) = pj(a
′
N ) for all i, j ∈ N and all aN , a
′
N ∈ A
N with ai = a
′
j and
#(a−i) = #(a
′
−j),
• self-anonymous if pi(aN ) = pi(a
′
N ) for all i ∈ N and all aN , a
′
N ∈ A
N with #(aN ) =
#(a′N ), and
• self-symmetric if pi(aN ) = pj(a
′
N ) for all i, j ∈ N and all aN , a
′
N ∈ A
N with #(aN ) =
#(a′N ).
When talking about anonymous games, we write pi(ai, x−i) for the payoff of player i
under any action profile aN with #(a−i) = x−i. For self-anonymous games, pi(x) is used to
denote the payoff of player i under any profile aN with #(aN ) = x. Unless noted otherwise,
we assume that anonymous games are given explicitly, i.e., as a list of payoffs for the different
commutative images.
A well-known method for simplifying strategic games is the removal of actions that
are weakly dominated by some strategy of the same player, in the sense that playing
the latter is never worse than playing the former and sometimes strictly better. The re-
moval of one or more dominated actions may render additional actions dominated, which
may then iteratively be removed. To make these notions precise, we need some notation.
Given a game Γ = (N, (Ai)i∈N , (pi)i∈N ), call an elimination sequence of Γ a finite se-
quence (D1,D2, . . . ,Dk) of subsets of the disjoint union of the sets Ai, i.e., Dj ⊆ ∪i∈NA
∗
i
for all j with 1 ≤ j ≤ k, where A∗i = Ai × {i}. For a set D ⊆ ∪i∈NA
∗
i , denote
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by Γ (D) the induced subgame of Γ where the actions in D have been removed, i.e.,
Γ (D) = (N, (A′i)i∈N , (pi|
Q
i∈N A
′
i
)i∈N ) where A
′
i = { a : (a, i) ∈ A
∗
i \D }.
Definition 2.3 (iterated dominance). Let Γ = (N, (Ai)i∈N , (pi)i∈N ) be a game. An action
di ∈ Ai is said to be (weakly) dominated by strategy si ∈ Si if for all b ∈
∏
j∈N Aj ,
pi(b−i, di) ≤
∑
ai∈Ai
si(ai)pi(b−i, ai) and for at least one b ∈
∏
j∈N Aj , pi(b−i, di) <∑
ai∈Ai
si(ai)pi(b−i, ai). An elimination sequence (D1,D2, . . . ,Dm) of Γ is called valid
if either it is the empty sequence, or if (D1,D2, . . . ,Dm−1) is valid in Γ and every
dm ∈ Dm is dominated in Γ (∪1≤j≤m−1Dj). An action a ∈ ∪i∈NAi is called eliminable
if there exists a valid elimination sequence (D1,D2, . . . ,Dm) such that a is weakly dom-
inated in Γ (∪1≤j≤mDj). Game Γ is called solvable if it is possible to obtain a game
where only one action remains for each player, i.e., if there exists a valid elimination se-
quence (D1,D2, . . . ,Dm) such that Γ (∪1≤j≤mDj) = (N, (A
′
i)i∈N , (p
′
i)i∈N ) with |A
′
i| = 1 for
all i ∈ N .
We call iterated dominance solvability (IDS) and eliminability (IDE) the computational
problems that ask for solvability of a game and eliminability of a particular action. In
contrast to iterated strict dominance, which requires the inequality to be strict for every
action profile of the other players, the result of iterated weak dominance depends on the
order in which actions are removed, since the elimination of an action may render actions
of another player undominated (e.g., [2]).
Restricted types of iterated dominance can be obtained by requiring that the dominat-
ing strategy si is pure, or that the elements of an elimination sequence are singletons and
actions thus have to be eliminated one at a time (e.g., [2]). As far as dominance by pure
and mixed strategies is concerned, we will frequently exploit that the two versions coincide
in games with two actions, and also in games with only two different payoffs [6]. All results
hold for dominance by pure strategies and for dominance by mixed strategies. Valid elim-
ination sequences consisting of singletons possess a somewhat less complicated structure.
We therefore in some cases restrict our attention to this specialization, and refer to the
corresponding computational problems as stepwise IDS and IDE. The results ultimately
obtained for the two variants will be very similar. A different notion of solvability merely
requires the remaining action profiles to yield a unique payoff to each of the players (e.g.,
[14]). We note, but do not show here, that all hardness and tractability results extend to
this notion as well.
3. Complexity of Iterated Dominance
Intuitively, a large number of actions neutralizes the computational advantage obtained
from anonymity, by allowing for a distinction of the players by means of the actions they
play. The search for pure Nash equilibria, for example, is tractable for anonymous games
with a constant number of actions, but becomes NP-hard as soon as the number of actions
grows in the number of players [5]. In the latter case, the size of the explicit representation
grows exponentially in the number of players, and one would expect natural instances of such
games to be described succinctly (cf. [16]). While as a matter of fact the results of Brandt
et al. [5] are established via a specific encoding of the payoff functions, namely Boolean
circuits, they nevertheless provide interesting insights into the influence of restricted classes
of payoff functions on the complexity of solving a game. We give a similar result for iterated
dominance in self-symmetric games, hardness for the other classes follows by inclusion.
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Theorem 3.1. IDS and IDE are NP-hard for all four classes of anonymous games, even if
the number of actions grows only logarithmically in the number of players, if only dominance
by pure strategies is considered, and if there are only two different payoffs.
In the case of symmetric games, iterated dominance becomes tractable when the number
of actions is bounded by a constant.
Theorem 3.2. For symmetric and self-symmetric games with a constant number of actions,
IDS and IDE can be decided in polynomial time.
In light of these two results, only one interesting class remains, namely anonymous
games with a constant number of actions. To gain a better understanding of the problem,
we restrict ourselves even further to games with two actions. It turns out that in this case
iterated dominance can be reformulated in a natural way as an elimination problem on
matrices. The latter is the topic of the following section.
4. A Matrix Elimination Problem
Let Γ = ([n], ({0, 1})i∈N , (pi)i∈N ) be a self-anonymous game with two actions for each
player, and observe that the payoffs of Γ can be represented by a matrix XΓ = (xi,j)(n+1)×n
the ith row of which contains the payoff profile when exactly i − 1 players play action 1,
i.e., xij = pj(i − 1). It will be instructive to view iterated dominance elimination in Γ in
terms of the corresponding operations on the matrix XΓ . For now, we restrict our attention
to the case where actions are eliminated one by one, and more generally consider matrices
with an arbitrary number of rows and columns. It suffices to look at matrices whose entries
are natural numbers.
Let X be an m×n matrix with entries from the natural numbers. Call a column c of X
increasing for an interval I over the rows of X if the entries in c are monotonically increasing
in I, with a strict increase somewhere in this interval. Analogously, call c decreasing for I
if its entries are monotonically decreasing in I, with a strict decrease somewhere in this
interval. Say that c is active for I if it is either increasing or decreasing for this interval.
Now consider a process that starts with X and successively eliminates pairs of a row and a
column. Rows will only be eliminated from the top or bottom, such that the remaining rows
always form an interval over the rows of X. A column will only be eliminated if it is active
for the remaining rows. Elimination of an increasing column is accompanied by elimination
of the top row. Analogously, a decreasing column and the bottom row are eliminated at
the same time. The process ends when no active columns remain.
Let us define the problem more formally. For a set A, v ∈ An, and a ∈ A, denote
by #(a, v) = |{ ℓ ≤ n : vℓ = a }| the commutative image of a and v, and write v...k =
(c1, c2, . . . , ck) for the prefix of v of length k ≤ n. Further denote [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} and
[n]0 = {0, 1, . . . , n}.
Definition 4.1 (matrix elimination). Let X ∈ Nm×n be a matrix. Call a column k ∈ [n]
of X increasing in an interval [i, j] ⊆ [m] if the sequence xik, xi+1,k, . . . , xjk is monotonically
increasing and xik < xjk, decreasing in [i, j] ⊆ [m] if xik, xi+1,k, . . . , xjk is monotonically
decreasing and xik > xjk, and active if it is either increasing or decreasing. Then, an
elimination sequence of length k for X is a pair (c, r) such that c ∈ [m]k, r ∈ {0, 1}k , and
for all i, j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, ci 6= cj and either ri = 0 and column ci is increasing in
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a b c d
1 3 2 1
0 2 2 1
0 2 3 0
0 2 3 0
3 2 3 0
a b c d
1 2 1
0 2 1
0 3 0
0 3 0
a b c d
2 1
2 1
3 0
a b c d
1
0
Figure 1: A matrix and a sequence of eliminations
[#(0, r...i−1) + 1,m −#(1, r...i−1)], or ri = 1 and column ci is decreasing in [#(0, r...i−1) +
1,m−#(1, r...i−1)].
Consider for example the sequence of matrices shown in Figure 1, obtained by starting
with the 5×4 matrix on the left and successively eliminating columns b, a, c, and d. In this
particular example, the process ends when all rows and columns of the matrix have been
eliminated. If instead we eliminated columns c and a, no further eliminations would be
possible. In fact, it would be obvious after the first elimination step that we cannot obtain
a sequence of length 4: one of the columns not eliminated so far, column b, contains the
same value in every row; this column cannot become active anymore, and, as a consequence,
will never be eliminated.
What matters are not the actual matrix entries, but rather the difference between
successive entries in a column. A more intuitive way to look at the problem may thus be in
terms of a matrix with the number of rows reduced by one, and arrows pointing downward
or upward if the value increases or decreases between two adjacent entries. A column can
be deleted if it contains at least one arrow, and if all arrows in this column point in the
same direction. The corresponding row to be deleted is the one at the base of the arrows.
We will be interested in two computational problems. Matrix elimination (ME) asks
whether there exists an elimination sequence that deletes the whole matrix, i.e., one of
length min(m − 1, n). Eliminability of a column (CE) is given k ∈ [n] and asks whether
there exists an elimination sequence (c, r) such that for some i, ci = k. Without restrictions
on m and n, ME and CE turn out to be equivalent. Indeed, both of them are equivalent
to the problem of deciding whether there exists an elimination sequence eliminating certain
numbers of rows from the top and bottom of the matrix. Several other questions, like the
one of an elimination sequence of a certain length, are equivalent as well.
Lemma 4.2. CE and ME are equivalent under disjunctive truth-table reductions.
When restricted to the case m > n, CE is at least as hard as ME in the sense that the
latter can be reduced to the former while there is no obvious reduction in the other direction.
The problem ME itself might be harder when the number of columns significantly exceeds
the number of rows, because then the set of columns effectively needs to be partitioned into
two sets of sizes m and n−m of columns that have to be deleted and columns that can be
discarded right away.
It is not hard to see that elimination of a matrix X is closely related to iterated dom-
inance in the self-anonymous game described at the beginning of this section, where each
player has two actions 0 and 1, and the payoff of player j when exactly i − 1 players play
action 1 is given by matrix entry xij . Given actions for the other players, player j can
choose between two adjacent entries of column j, so one of his two actions is dominated
by the other one if the column is increasing or decreasing. Eliminating one of two actions
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effectively removes a player from the game, and elimination of the top or bottom row of
the matrix mirrors the fact that the number of players who can still choose between both
of their actions is reduced by one. Let us formally establish this relationship.
Lemma 4.3. Stepwise IDS and IDE in anonymous games with two actions are equivalent
under disjunctive truth-table reductions to ME and CE, respectively, restricted to instances
with m = n+ 1.
We could have well allowed the simultaneous elimination of columns, and it is fairly
obvious that the resulting computational problems would be equivalent to IDS and IDE.
So why do we require columns to be eliminated one at a time? For one, solving ME and
CE as defined above turns out to be intricate enough to begin with, and we will ultimately
not be able to characterize their complexity. On the other hand, the additional structure
afforded by stepwise elimination will help us to gain additional insights, which we will then
use to prove the main result of this paper: NP-hardness of IDS and IDE in games with three
actions, both for stepwise and simultaneous eliminations. Finally, much of the complexity
of matrix elimination already appears to be present in the stepwise version, and any result
for that version can probably be extended to simultaneous eliminations as well.
Solving ME in general turns out to be surprisingly complicated. A natural restriction
can be obtained by requiring that all columns are increasing or decreasing in [1,m]. It is not
too hard to show that this makes the problem tractable irrespective of the dimensions of
the matrix, and we do so in the next section as a corollary of a slightly more general result.
Unfortunately, tractability of this restricted case does not tell us a lot about the complexity
of ME in general. The latter obviously becomes almost trivial if the order of elimination for
the columns is known, i.e., if we are given c ∈ [n]k and ask whether there exists r ∈ {0, 1}k
such that (c, r) is an elimination sequence. This observation directly implies membership in
NP. More interestingly, deciding whether there exists c ∈ [n]k for a given r ∈ {0, 1}k such
that (c, r) is an elimination sequence is also tractable. The reason is the specific “life cycle”
of a column. Consider a matrix X, two intervals I, J ⊆ [m] over the rows of X such that
J ⊆ I, and a column c ∈ [n] that is active in both I and J . Then, c must also be active for
any interval K such that J ⊆ K ⊆ I, and c must either be increasing for all three intervals,
or decreasing for all three intervals. Thus, r determines for every i ∈ [k] a set of possible
values for ci, and leaves us with a matching problem in a bipartite graph with edges in
[n]× [k]. The latter can be solved in polynomial time. Closer inspection reveals that it can
in fact be decomposed into two independent matching problems on convex bipartite graphs,
for which the best known upper bound is NC2 [11].
But what if nothing about c and r is known? Despite the fact that we can only eliminate
the top or bottom row of the matrix in each step, this still amounts to an exponential number
of possible sequences. The best upper bound for matching in convex bipartite graphs means
that there currently is not much hope for constructing an algorithm that determines r
nondeterministically and computes a matching on the fly. We can nevertheless use the
above reasoning to recast the problem in the more general framework of matching on paths.
For this, we will respectively identify intervals and pairs of intervals over the rows of X
with vertices and edges of a directed graph G, and will then label each edge (I, J) by the
identifiers of the columns of X that take I to J . An elimination sequence of length k for X
then corresponds to a path of length k in G which starts at the vertex corresponding to the
interval [1,m], such that there exists a matching of size k between the edges on this path
and the columns of X. In particular, by fixing a particular path, we obtain the bipartite
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matching problem described above. A more detailed discussion of this problem is the topic
of the following section. We first study the problem itself, and return to matrix elimination
toward the end of the section.
5. Matched Paths
The matching problem described in the previous section generalizes the well-studied
class of matching problems between two disjoint sets, or bipartite matching problems, by
requiring that the elements of one of the two sets form a certain sub-structure of a combina-
torial structure. Most interesting from a computational perspective are variants where the
underlying combinatorial structure can be identified in polynomial time, as it is the case
for paths or for spanning trees.
Definition 5.1 (matching, matched path). Let X be a set, Σ an alphabet, and σ : X → 2Σ
a labeling function assigning sets of labels to elements of X. Then, a matching of σ is a
total function f : X → Σ such that for all x, y ∈ X, f(x) ∈ σ(x) and f(y) 6= f(x) if y 6= x.
Let G = (V,E) be a directed graph, Σ an alphabet, and σ : E → 2Σ a labeling function
for edges of G. Then, a matched path of length k in G is a sequence e1, e2, . . . , ek such that
for all i with 1 ≤ i < k, there exist u, v,w ∈ V such that ei = (u, v) and ei+1 = (v,w), and
the restriction of σ to { ei : 1 ≤ i ≤ k } has a matching.
We call matched path (MP) the computational problem that asks, for an explicitly given
directed graph G with corresponding labeling function σ and an integer k, whether there
exists a matched path of length k in G. Variants of this problem can be obtained by asking
for a matching that contains a certain set of labels, or a matched path between a particular
pair of vertices. These variants have an interesting interpretation in terms of sequencing
with resources and multi-dimensional constraints on the utilization of these resources: every
resource can be used in certain states corresponding to vertices of a directed graph, and
their use causes transitions between states. The goal then is to find a sequence that uses a
specific set or a certain number of resources, or one that reaches a certain state.
In the context of this paper, we are particularly interested in instances of MP corre-
sponding to instances of ME. We will see later that the graphs of such instances are layered
grid graphs (e.g., [1]), and that the labeling function satisfies a certain convexity property.
But let us look at the general problem for a bit longer. Greenlaw et al. [12] consider the
related labeled graph accessibility problem, which, given a directed graph G with a single
label attached to each edge, asks whether there exists a path such that the concatenation
of the labels along the path is a member of a context free language L given as part of the
input. This problem is P-complete in general and LOGCFL-complete if G is acyclic. A
matching, however, corresponds to a partial permutation of the members of the alphabet,
and the number of nonterminal symbols of any context-free grammar in Chomsky normal
form for the permutation language over Σ grows super-polynomially in the size of Σ [8].
It thus should not come as a surprise that the problem becomes harder when we ask for
a matching. Indeed, MP bears some resemblance to the NP-complete problem forbidden
pairs of finding a path in a directed or undirected graph if certain pairs of nodes or edges
may not be used together [9]. Instead of reducing forbidden pairs to MP, however, we show
NP-hardness of a restricted version of MP using a more complicated construction, on which
we will be able to build in Section 6. To formally state the result we need some terminology.
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Let G = (V,E) be a directed graph with vertex set V = [m]0 × [n]0. Call (u, v) ∈ E a
south edge if for some i and j, u = (i, j) and v = (i + 1, j), and an east edge if for some i
and j, u = (i, j) and v = (i, j + 1). Then, G is called an m × n layered grid graph if it
contains only south and east edges. In labeled graphs, nonexistent edges and edges that are
mapped to the empty set by the labeling function are equivalent. We therefore concentrate
on complete layered grid graphs, i.e., those containing all south and all east edges.
Theorem 5.2. MP is NP-complete. Hardness holds even if G is a complete layered grid
graph, |σ(e)| ≤ 1 for every e ∈ E, and |{ e ∈ E : λ ∈ σ(e) }| ≤ 2 for every λ ∈ Σ.
The proof of this theorem starts by looking at a complete m × n grid graph G for
appropriate values of m and n, and at a labeling function σ : [m]0 ∪ [n]0 → Σ. The
latter can be interpreted as a labeling function for edges of G where a label either appears
on all the edges in a given row or column or on none of them. Labels in Σ correspond
to variable occurrences in an instance of the NP-complete problem balanced one-in-three
3SAT [17], and σ is defined in such a way that a path through the graph corresponds to
an assignment of truth values to variable occurrences. The overall structure of the graph
consist of two parts. In the first part, consistency of the overall assignment is ensured by
placing labels corresponding to different occurrences of the same variable on the same path.
In the second part, the same labels are used again to verify that all clauses are satisfied
by the assignment. To obtain Theorem 5.2 and get a better understanding of the minimal
requirements for hardness, the graph is then modified further. An important property of
the labeling function in this context seems to be that the same label can appear at least
twice in different parts of the graph.
The labeling function σ can also more generally be interpreted as belonging to a more
general graph where transitions can take place from any vertex to any other vertex to the
south and east of it, as long as the distance in columns between the two vertices is at most
the number of unused labels that appear on the row associated with the former vertex, and
the same condition holds for the distance in rows and the number of labels on the column.
Intuitively, this type of transition occurs when several dominated actions of a game are
eliminated simultaneously. It will play an important role in the proof of Theorem 6.1.
Let us now return to matrix elimination. In light of Theorem 5.2, an efficient algorithm
for ME would have to exploit additional structure of MP instances induced by instances
of ME. This structure is indeed quite restricted in that edges carrying a particular label λ
satisfy a “directed” convexity condition: if λ appears on two edges e = (u, v) and e′ =
(u′, v′), then λ must appear on all south edges or on all east edges that lie on a path from u
to v′, but not both. In particular, if there is such a path, it cannot be that one of e and e′ is
a south edge and the other is an east edge. This fact is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows
the labeled graph for the ME instance of Figure 1, as well as a matched path corresponding
to an elimination sequence of maximum length.
Definition 5.3 (directed convexity). Let G = (V,E) be a complete layered grid graph. A
labeling function σ : E → 2Σ for G is called directed convex if for every label λ ∈ Σ and for
every set of three edges e1 = (u1, v1), e2 = (u2, v2), e3 = (u3, v3), such that u2 is reachable
from u1, u3 is reachable from u2, and λ ∈ σ(e1) ∩ σ(e3), it holds that e1 and e3 have the
same direction and λ ∈ σ(e2) if and only if e2 has the same direction as well.
It is not too hard to see that instances corresponding to ME have a directed convex
labeling function.
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(0, 0) (0, 4)
(1, 3)
(2, 2)
(3, 1)
(4, 0)
{b, d} {a, b, d} {a, b, d} {a}
{c} {c} {c} ∅
{b, d} {b, d} {b,d}
{a, c} {c} {c}
∅ ∅
{a} ∅
∅
{a}
Figure 2: Labeled graph for the matrix elimination instance of Figure 1. A matched path
and its matching are shown in bold.
Lemma 5.4. ME is polynomial time many-one reducible to MP restricted to layered grid
graphs and directed convex labeling functions.
Directed convexity of the labeling function means that we cannot show NP-hardness of
ME by a construction similar to the one used in the proof of Theorem 5.2. On the other
hand, it is not quite clear how the additional structure provided by directed convexity can
be exploited to obtain a polynomial-time algorithm for ME. The case m ≤ n will probably
add additional complications. We therefore leave the complexity of ME as an open problem,
albeit quite an elegant one.
Here we consider a more special case of MP, which provides additional insights. In
the corresponding instances of ME, all columns are active at the beginning of the matrix
elimination process, or all columns are active in the interval of length one at the end of the
elimination process.
Definition 5.5 (backward and forward closure). Let G = (V,E) be a complete layered
grid graph. Let s be the unique vertex of G with in-degree zero, t the unique vertex with
outdegree zero. Then, a labeling function σ : E → 2Σ for G is called backward closed if
{λ ∈ σ(s, v) : (s, v) ∈ E} = Σ. Similarly, σ is called forward closed if {λ ∈ σ(s, v) : (v, t) ∈
E} = Σ.
It may not have gone unnoticed that these properties are closely related to closure prop-
erties found respectively in matroids and antimatroids. Together with directed convexity,
each of the closure properties further implies that each label appears only on east edges or
only on south edges. This allows us to consider two distinct matching problems, one for
east and one for south edges, and obtain a tractability result.
Theorem 5.6. Let G = (V,E) be a complete layered grid graph, σ a labeling function for G
that is directed convex and either backward or forward closed. Then, MP for G and σ can
be solved in nondeterministic logarithmic space.
A generalization of both backward and forward closure can be obtained by considering
labeling functions that are connected in the sense that the edges carrying a particular
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0
2
1 0 1
3
001
0 0
1
1
0
2
1 0 1
3
001
0 0
1
0
2
1 0
001
0 0
1
3 1
01
0 0
1
3
2
Figure 3: Payoffs of a particular player in a self-anonymous game with n = 3 and k =
3. Initially all actions are pairwise undominated. If one of the other players
eliminates action 1, action 3 weakly dominates action 1. Action 1 then becomes
undominated if some player deletes action 3, and dominated by action 2 if one
more player deletes action 3, and some player deletes action 2.
label, together with all edges in the respective other direction, form a weakly connected
graph. This property introduces a dependence between the matching problems for the two
directions, and a very interesting question is whether Theorem 5.6 can be generalized to
this setting.
6. Self-Anonymous Games with a Constant Number of Actions
It is natural to ask whether iterated dominance for games with more than two actions
can still be interpreted in terms of eliminations in a matrix or matrix-like structure. Consider
a self-anonymous game with k actions. As before, the payoff of a particular player i only
depends on the number of players, including the player itself, that play each of the different
actions. They can thus be written down as entries in a discrete simplex of dimension k− 1.
The elimination of the ℓth action by some player can then be interpreted as a cut along
the ℓth 0-face of the simplex of every player.
The left hand side of Figure 3 shows the payoffs of a particular player in a self-
anonymous game with n = 3 and k = 3. Compared to matrix elimination as introduced
in Definition 4.1 and illustrated in Figure 1, we notice an interesting shift, which curiously
has nothing to do with the added possibility of dominance by mixed strategies. Rather,
a particular action a ∈ A may now be eliminated by either one of several other actions
in A \ {a}, and the situations where a can be eliminated no longer form a convex set.
This already indicates that it might be possible to construct a layered grid graph with
corresponding labeling function for which the existence of a matched path is NP-hard to
decide, and which is induced by a self-anonymous game with three actions for each player.
To obtain our main result we however have to overcome one additional obstacle: when
dropping the assumption that actions are eliminated one at a time, the equivalence between
elimination sequences and labeled paths in a layered grid graph breaks down. We therefore
start from the construction used in the proof of Theorem 5.2, and use additional vertices
and labels to make it work for the more general type of transitions corresponding to the
simultaneous elimination of actions.
Theorem 6.1. IDS and IDE are NP-complete. Hardness holds even for self-anonymous
games with three actions and two different payoffs, and also applies to stepwise IDS and
IDE.
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